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UKIP’s rise is not just a problem for the Conservatives – they
are emerging as the party of choice for disaffected and angry
voters from all parties
The UK Independence Party started 2013 riding high, after enjoying their two best ever-
election results towards the end of the year. Rob Ford offers a detailed analysis of what is
driving this electoral success, arguing that UKIP is a much more complex proposition than
most political commentator seem to grasp. Nonetheless, it will take a significant change of
strategy for their current momentum to translate into election success. Without local
strongholds they will win nothing in a general election.
The UK Independence Party had their two best ever by-election results in late 2012 –
scoring a record 14% in Corby in mid-November, then topping this again with 21% in the Rotherham by-
election. This sharp rise in support – and the continued polling and by-election misery of  the Liberal
Democrats – have understandably lead to a lot of  discussion. Where is support f or UKIP coming f rom?
What do UKIP leaning voters want? And what are the implications of  UKIP’s rise in the polls f or Brit ish
polit ics going f orward?
To answer some of  these questions, I can draw on a very large and comprehensive data sources to
show this – the Brit ish Election Study Continuous Monitoring Survey, conducted by YouGov every month
since about 2004. This is an invaluable resource, with detailed inf ormation on the views and polit ical
pref erence of  hundreds of  thousands of  voters surveyed over the past 8 years.
Table 1: How UKIP supporters voted in the previous election
Source: British Election Study Continuous Monitoring Survey 2004-12, fielded by YouGov. Standard
demographic weights applied
First, let’s take a look at where UKIP voters come f rom. Table 1 charts how current UKIP voters report
having voted in the previous election. Since the Coalit ion began in 2010, UKIP’s support has more than
doubled, f rom under 4% just af ter the 2010 election to nearly 9% in the most recent poll months. A big
part of  this rise is indeed due to Conservative def ections – the share of  f ormer Conservatives among
UKIP voters has risen. But it has risen f rom a low base. In 2009, roughly 2 in 10 UKIP voters had voted
Conservative in the previous election. Now, it is 4 in 10. So, even now less than half  of  UKIP’s current
support is coming f rom f ormer Tory voters.
Another 40% or so voted “other” in the previous election – these are mostly UKIP loyalists who cast
ballots f or their current party at the last election. Might such voters be tempted over to the
Conservatives? Perhaps, but research I have done with colleagues on UKIP loyalists suggests many
come f rom working class, Labour leaning backgrounds, and are deeply hostile to all the establishment
parties. This is borne out in the YouGov data – UKIP supporters’ views of  all three parties’ leaders are
strongly and persistently negative, and they are more likely to express alienation f rom polit ics and
dissatisf action with democracy. It is very doubtf ul that the Conservatives would sweep such voters if
they allied with UKIP. And on top of  this, a f urther quarter of  recent UKIP support has come f rom Labour
and the Lib Dems, or f rom abstainers. These are not groups the Conservatives are likely to win over with
an alliance.
So, while some Conservative support seems to be leaking to UKIP recently, they are by no means solely
a home f or discontented Tories. This brings us to the second question – what motivates UKIP voters?
UKIP polit icians themselves tend to trumpet their growing popularity as vindication of  their core agenda:
Europe. While Brit ish voters have become more sceptical about the EU over recent years – unsurprising
give the steady f low of  “Eurozone crisis” news – there is lit t le evidence that the rise in UKIP support is
the result of  a surge in concern about the EU.
Table 2 shows the f our most popular answers UKIP supporters have given since 2004 when asked what
is the most important issue f acing Britain. The most popular answer, by f ar, is immigration, named by
30% of  UKIP respondents overall, and the most popular answer in every single year since 2004. Europe
has seldom even been the second biggest issue in UKIP voters’ minds: since 2008, the economy has
taken precedence, and bef ore that voters were more likely to point to a general dislike of  the Labour
government. To put in bluntly, most UKIP voters (unlike most UKIP polit icians) do not regard Europe as
the main issue on the agenda.
Table 2: Most important issue, UKIP voters
Source: British Election Study Continuous Monitoring Survey 2004-12, fielded by YouGov. Standard
demographic weights applied
So UKIP’s rise is clearly not the result of  temporary def ections by Conservative voters annoyed about
Europe. What, then, is going on? My ongoing research with Matthew Goodwin suggests that UKIP shares
many characteristics with “radical right” parties such as the Dutch Party f or Freedom, the Danish People’s
Party, the Austrian Freedom Party and the True Finns. Like these parties, UKIP mobilises voters who are
primarily concerned about immigration, but are also typically nationalist, Eurosceptic and deeply
disaf f ected with the existing polit ical elite. In many cases these parties, or their leaders, began on the
mainstream right, bef ore breaking away to f ocus on a more populist agenda.
UKIP’s evolution has been similar – it began as a rebellion on the centre-right over Europe, but under
Nigel Farage has developed a broader populist and anti- immigration agenda. UKIP’s appeal – anger over
immigration, anxiety about national identity, hostility to the EU and a deep disaf f ection with “polit ics as
usual” – cuts right across tradit ional party dividing lines, enabling the party to recruit angry voters
regardless of  who is in charge. As table 1 shows, UKIP was as successf ul winning over grumpy Labour
voters during the previous government as it is at winning grumpy Tories now.
What lessons can the parties draw f rom all this? The Conservatives need to realise that Michael
Fabricant’s plan f or a blue-purple alliance is, in the words of  one of  my colleagues, “the polit ics of  not
understanding data”. UKIP voters are a more diverse, and disaf f ected, lot than right wing Conservative
backbenchers seem to realise. Most are not f ormer Conservative voters, and are unlikely to be thrilled if
their party – which recently ran on the slogan “Sod The Lot: vote UKIP” – were to align itself  with a
polit ical elite which disgusts them. A UKIP alliance will deliver f ew votes, and less seats. Indeed, by
alienating moderate voters, such an alliance could do more harm than good.
Labour should not celebrate the rise of  UKIP either. UKIP’s agenda – hostility to immigration, social
conservatism, Euroscepticism and populism – proved almost as appealing to Labour voters in 2004-10
as it is to Conservatives right now. UKIP’s strongest support of ten comes f rom older working class
voters, who of ten have tradit ional lef t wing loyalt ies. A strong UKIP will pose as many problems f or an
incoming Labour government as it does f or the Conservative incumbents.
Finally, UKIP polit icians and activists themselves need to develop a clearer understanding of  what the
surge in UKIP support means. UKIP’s voters, new and old, are angry about immigration, threatened by
social change, and deeply hostile to the polit ical class. This does ref lect a coherent set of  public
concerns – we f ind it in other countries too – but it is not the concerns which most exercise many UKIP
activists, who are of ten f ocussed on deregulation, tax cuts, and above all, Brussels.
This disconnect raises a serious problem f or UKIP: it cannot become a genuine “third f orce” in Brit ish
polit ics without an activist base able to mobilise voters. Yet the concerns which seem to attract activists
to UKIP are very dif f erent to those which attract voters to the party. This may explain why UKIP’s
persistent inability to break through in local elections – the party lacks the candidates and activists willing
to undertake the hard slog of  local polit ics, or a coherent agenda to sell to local voters.
This is the dif f erence between the Liberal Democrats and UKIP. The Lib Dems have a relentless f ocus on
local organisation, and use this to channel popular discontent into local election wins, by-election wins,
and eventual Westminster success. Tip O’Neill once observed that “all polit ics is local”, and under f irst
past the post this is the brutal truth: UKIP may carry on rising in the national polls, but without local
strongholds they will win nothing in a general election. Nigel Farage is riding high right now, but without a
radical shif t in party strategy I wouldn’t bet on seeing him or any of  his colleagues warming the benches
of  the House of  Commons in 2015.
This post was f irst published on Polit ical Betting. 
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